Introduction

The Bible portrays God as having and exercising sovereign control over all things, even the free acts of men, yet man is held morally responsible for their sinfulness. If God determines human actions, how are humans held morally responsible for them? How can he place blame when no one can alter his plan made from eternity past? Must people simply accept the biblical claim that God is absolutely sovereign and man is morally culpable, even if it cannot be explained how the two concepts can both be true?¹ Romans 9:19 raises the question: “Why does he still find fault, for who can resist his will?”² The answer: “Who are you, O man, to answer back to God? Will what is molded say to its molder, ‘Why have you made me like this?’ Has the potter no right over the clay, to make out of the same lump one vessel for honorable use and another for dishonorable use?” Does this mean the truths of divine sovereignty and human responsibility are irreconcilable? This is not necessarily the point of Paul’s statement. The answer provided in Romans 9:20–24 assumes the questioner is accusing God of injustice—that God rules unfairly over his creation. Is there an answer for someone who reverently acknowledges God’s sovereign control and humbly seeks to understand and submit to God’s ways? The solution presented in this paper argues that it is possible to understand how man is culpable for his actions even if every single action has been decreed by the sovereign hand of God.

The thesis to be argued in this paper is that God predetermines all things, including sin, yet mankind is held morally responsible since they choose sin freely and are creatures answerable to their creator.³ The goal is not to argue for God’s sovereignty and human responsibility as distinct principles, affirming both and letting the tension lie. Instead the goal is to analyze the relationship between the two principles and propose a system that accounts for both truth claims without logical contradiction or antinomy. While divine responsibility is not the main focus of this paper, it is briefly discussed as it relates to human responsibility.

Limiting the Scope

In this paper only proposals under a Calvinistic theological system will be considered when harmonizing the doctrines of divine sovereignty and human responsibility. This excludes limited-sovereignty models such as the free-will defense or middle-knowledge theory.⁴ The free-will defense rests on the notion that God limited himself in order to create creatures that were autonomous, exercising “true” (contra-causal) freedom, even if that leads to events that God does not desire to take place.⁵ The middle-knowledge theory posits God faced with all the possible worlds where autonomous creatures make “truly free” (contra-causal) choices and God selects the best world that is closest to or fits his purposes.⁶ In both systems, human freedom necessarily limits God and (in a sense) makes the creature dictate the Creator.⁷ They are ruled out as options because such a notion cannot be reconciled with Scripture. The Bible affirms the independence of God. “Whatever the LORD pleases, he does, in heaven and on earth, in the seas and all deeps” (Ps 135:6). “The LORD brings the counsel of the nations to nothing; he frustrates the plans of the peoples. The counsel of the LORD stands forever, the plans of his heart to all generations” (Ps 33:10–11).⁸

Formalizing the Problem

The tension between divine sovereignty and human responsibility is a formidable problem. A. W. Pink refers to it as the Gordian knot of theology.⁹ As previously mentioned, certain theological systems deny God’s absolute sovereignty over all things or propose that he sovereignly gives man the ability or freedom to override his complete control. This is because, if God is absolutely sovereign, they cannot escape the following syllogism:

Premise 1: Nothing comes to pass outside of God’s sovereign decree.
Premise 2: Sin exists, and man is sinful.
Corollary: Sin and sinful man are part of God’s decree.
Conclusion: God is morally responsible for sin and man’s sinfulness, not man.

The conclusion is rightly denied by Christian thinkers. However, this is often done by limiting divine sovereignty (tantamount to denying the first premise) or by denying that God decreed sin, but instead decreed free creatures (i.e., denying the corollary). This is done in to vindicate God’s responsibility for sin and impugn man. What will be shown is that the two premises and the corollary are in fact true, but that the conclusion does not follow. A successful argument must affirm the premises and corollary, yet account for man’s responsibility while denying God as the author of sin.

A brief defense of the syllogism is offered here to highlight the tensions before a solution is proposed and defended.

First Premise: Nothing Comes to Pass Outside of God’s Decree

The premise that nothing comes to pass outside of God’s decree must be affirmed. The Bible is clear in passages such as Ephesians 1:11 which state that God “works all things according to the counsel of his will” (cf. Rom 8:28). Even the very details of a person’s life are predetermined by God (Ps 139:16).

Second Premise: Sin Exists, and Man is Sinful

The premise that sin exists and man is sinful must be affirmed as Scripture has much to say on the subject. Paul demonstrates in Romans 1–3 that all humanity (both Jew and Greek) are under sin (Rom 3:9). Because of the fall, “death spread to all men because all sinned” (Rom 5:12).

Corollary: God Decreed Sin and Man’s Sinfulness

If God decrees whatever comes to pass then he has necessarily decreed sin and man’s sinfulness. A biblical example will suffice. The crucifixion took place according to the predetermined plan of God (Acts 2:23). The sinful actions of Herod, Pontius Pilate, the Gentiles, and the people of Israel were predetermined by God and were carried out according to his purpose (Acts 4:27–28). The corollary, therefore, must be affirmed as both necessary and explicitly taught in Scripture.

Conclusion: God is Morally Responsible for Sin and Man’s Sinfulness, Not Man

The conclusion that God is morally responsible for sin and man’s sinfulness must be denied since it cannot be reconciled with the Scriptures nor the nature of God (Matt 5:48; Jas 1:13). Using salvation as an example, the Bible is clear that man is solely responsible for the sin of unbelief and God is solely responsible for man’s belief. Being responsible for their sin, unbelievers are condemned for it (John 3:18), whereas believers have no basis for boasting (1 Cor 1:29) since they believe because they have been born from above (John 3:3). The tension is most notable here—the unbeliever is responsible for his unbelief, and yet the believer is not responsible for his belief. The question that remains to be addressed is: how can God be praised for the good man does and not be responsible for the evil man commits when he has decreed everything that comes to pass?

There are many other examples where Scripture affirms human responsibility for sin under the sovereign plan of God. Genesis 50:20 describes the evil intent of Joseph’s brothers and God’s good intent in sending Joseph to Egypt as a slave. Isaiah 10:5–15 describes God using the king of Assyria as his tool to punish Israel, at the same time the king of Assyria is wicked in his heart and is punished by God. Proverbs 16:4–5 affirms that God has made everything for its purpose (including the wicked) and that the wicked are still responsible for their wickedness and will not go unpunished (cf. 1 Pet 2:7–8). Luke 22:22 describes the betrayal of Jesus that was predetermined by God, yet Judas is still responsible for the act of betrayal. Acts 4:27–28 affirms that the crucifixion took place according to God’s decree, yet the wicked men involved are responsible and are judged according to their actions (cf. Acts 2:23). One of the clearest passages on divine sovereignty and human responsibility is found in Romans 9 which affirms that God has created vessels of wrath and vessels of mercy (Rom 9:22–23), yet man is still answerable to God (Rom 9:19–20). The remainder of this paper addresses the reconciliation of these seemingly irreconcilable truths.

Definitions

Before presenting a solution, a number of theological concepts must be understood or else the argument is framed on false suppositions. Too often philosophical presuppositions dictate the solution and loose the argument from the moorings of Scripture. The other approach to avoid is one that rightly affirms divine sovereignty and human responsibility, yet does not attempt to systematize relevant texts and instead leaves those concepts in tension. The goal, therefore, is to avoid both of these approaches and construct a sound biblical and philosophical reconciliation between divine sovereignty and human responsibility.

The nature of God’s decree, responsibility, ability, freedom, determinism, and providence are all important to understand when discussing a solution to the relationship between divine sovereignty and human responsibility.¹⁰ These concepts must be understood correctly to address the culpability—both human and divine—in a world sovereignly ruled by God.

Determinism

Determinism is the “general philosophical thesis which states that for everything that ever happens there are conditions such that, given them, nothing else could happen.”¹¹ An indeterminist would deny that preconditions are sufficient to determine that a person would choose one thing over another.¹² The Bible clearly portrays human history as determined by God, “Have you not heard that I determined it long ago? I planned from days of old what now I bring to pass” (Isa 37:26). The events of the past, present, and future are made certain because they are predetermined by God.

“Remember the former things of old;
for I am God, and there is no other;
   I am God, and there is none like me,
declaring the end from the beginning
   and from ancient times things not yet done,
saying, ‘My counsel shall stand,
   and I will accomplish all my purpose.’” (Isaiah 46:9–10)¹³

A common misconception of the deterministic position is that it amounts to fatalism. Fatalism claims that there is an “inherent necessity in the way things are so that they could not be any other way.”¹⁴ It claims that God could not have created the world any other way; there is no other conceivable world that God could have created. Fatalism must be denied as God did not create this world from necessity, and he could have created another world if he had desired to do so.

Another common misconception is that man is reduced to a robot—a mechanical thing rather than a real person.¹⁵ In this world of robots, God is seen as judging and punishing man for things that God himself is responsible for. This is an obvious misrepresentation of Scripture’s teachings. Man is capable of love and intimacy with God and is given dominion over creation. God has sent his only Son to die for mankind, rescuing them from corruption so that they may enjoy eternal fellowship with him. This certainly does not portray people as simply robots. At the same time, man is still under the sovereign rule of God. Why does God lavish such attention and love upon man who is under his complete control? God is concerned about glorifying himself, and man serves him in that purpose. This fact conflicts with the modern view of absolute human autonomy. Those who believe in Scripture must be willing to humble themselves and accept their creatureliness—that they were made by, and for, their creator (Ps 8:4; Col 1:16).

Responsibility

In philosophy, responsibility is defined as “the notion that a person is answerable for his actions and so is a proper subject for praise or blame.”¹⁶ Scripturally, man is clearly answerable for his actions before God. This is a consequence of God’s supreme authority over mankind and his role as judge of human conduct.¹⁷ God has created man in his image (Gen 1:27–28) and commands him to “be holy, for I am holy” (Lev 11:44; cf. 19:2; Matt 5:48; 1 Peter 1:15–16). Man then is responsible to live according to God’s holy standards and is held responsible for every word, thought, and deed; whether they be acts of commission or acts of omission (Jas 4:17).¹⁸ In this sense of responsibility—the creature under the creator—man is always and totally responsible. This sense of responsibility and the creator-creature distinction must be at the fore of any biblical discussion on the nature of divine sovereignty and human responsibility. As creatures of God, man’s foremost responsibility is to recognize his creatureliness and glorify his Creator.¹⁹

The biblical understanding of human responsibility toward God is oftentimes diminished by the view that man is only responsible for what he freely chooses. An even more nuanced view of responsibility includes not only actions due to free choice but also consequences due to negligence. In other words, responsibility is tied to the results of man’s actions but not entirely to the results of man’s own decisions.²⁰ That is, man is liable for his actions and lack thereof.²¹ Responsibility as liability is usually understood to be measured in degrees of guilt. The modern law code is an example of this with murder being measured in degrees, or manslaughter being voluntary or involuntary. This kind of responsibility is not only predicated on freedom (free choices) but also on ability. If someone is unable to do otherwise, his action is not free and responsibility is lessened or even completely removed.²² It is in this sense that critics of determinism view responsibility. According to the indeterminist, if God has decreed every action that comes to pass then people cannot do otherwise, and if they could not have done otherwise (i.e., they lack the ability) then they should not be held responsible. This objection will be handed below in the discussion on ability.

In summary, responsibility has two senses. In the first sense, a person is completely responsible to God since he is under his supreme authority and is answerable to him for all his actions. In the second sense, responsibility is predicated on freedom and ability, i.e., responsibility is attributable when a person is liable for his actions. A person is thought not to be liable for his actions if he is unable to do otherwise and was therefore not acting freely. The nature of man’s ability and freedom (free will) must be considered to address how man can be liable for his actions.

Excursus on Ignorance

Before discussing the nature of man’s ability and freedom, a brief look at how ignorance affects responsibility assists in bringing light to the discussion. Ignorance factors into the tension between divine sovereignty and human responsibility in two ways. In the first way, some use ignorance to excuse man of responsibility. The objection is raised: if man is ignorant of God and his commands, how can man be held responsible for not obeying God?²³ In the second way, ignorance can be used to support human responsibility in a deterministic world. If man is ignorant of God’s decree—and he is (Deut 29:29)—then man makes decisions apart from knowing what God has decreed. That is, because man is ignorant of God’s decree, the decree does not act as a constraint upon man’s decisions or actions. This leaves man responsible for his own decisions.

The first way ignorance is used (i.e., where ignorance excuses man) is an unbiblical idea. The objection that ignorance of God and his commands frees man of responsibility is addressed in Romans 1:19–20. Ignorance of God simply cannot be appealed to. God has made himself known in what he has created and in man himself who is created in the image of God (Gen 1:26–27). God has written his morality on man’s heart and his conscience also bears witness (Rom 2:15). Man is without excuse before God, i.e., an appeal to ignorance does not free man from responsibility since he does know God.²⁴ In fact, ignorance is oftentimes willful, preferring it over knowledge, and results in increasing a person’s culpability. Suppressing the truth may or may not be a willful, but even in modern courts of law, “ignorance of the law is no excuse.”

Consider this illustration to support the second way (i.e., ignorance of God’s decree makes man responsible) ignorance is used. Suppose it is predetermined that Tom will be involved in minor car accident tomorrow. Tom is completely ignorant of this predetermined plan since, like all, Tom does not know the future or God’s decree. The following day, Tom sets out and drives his car to work like he does every day. Tom follows too closely to the car in front of him and, as he adjusts the radio, the car in front of him slows down. Tom is unable to react in time and his car collides into the car in front of him. In this case, Tom is fully responsible for his actions. He had no knowledge of God’s decree and therefore God’s decree did not influence his decision to follow too closely or to adjust the radio. As far as Tom was concerned, he acted completely autonomously and admits his responsibility. God’s decree is not an agent imposing itself on Tom against his will.

Therefore it is seen that ignorance cannot be used to excuse responsibility. Rather, from a human standpoint, ignorance of God’s decree leaves man responsible for his actions, even though they have been predetermined by God.

Ability

Like responsibility, ability must be discussed in more than one sense. For example, if someone is scheduled for a speaking engagement that conflicts with a previous appointment, it might be said that he can speak or that he cannot speak. He can speak in the sense that he is physically able to do it, but he cannot speak in the sense that he is speaking at a different event. Perhaps the speaker can make it to the event, but cannot speak due to severe illness.²⁵ This small example demonstrates that there are many senses in which a person is able or unable to act. In terms of man’s ability, it can be said that man is unable to do a certain act if it is not part of God’s decree. Yet it can also be said that man is able in another sense. For example, people cannot come to faith in Christ unless God draws them (John 6:44), yet in a physical sense people can believe in Christ since they are rational beings created in the image of God and capable of faith. People who cannot come to God do not lack anything physically, but do lack spiritually—they have not been born again (John 3:3; 1 John 5:1).

Thus, a distinction can be made between (1) spiritual or moral ability and (2) natural or physical ability.²⁶ In the first sense of ability, the Bible clearly teaches man’s spiritual and moral inability. In the second sense, man has natural and physical abilities. There is nothing physical that makes him unable to submit to Christ’s lordship. Therefore, people are held fully responsible since they are physically or naturally able to seek God. No one is keeping the unbeliever by force so that he is unable to come to Christ. If the unbeliever does not come to Christ then he has only himself to blame since in his natural ability, he never desired to seek God.²⁷

One example that demonstrates this distinction of ability is the crucifixion. The Jewish leaders, Pontius Pilot, Herod, and others involved were doing exactly what God had ordained (Acts 2:23; 4:27–28). In this sense, they were unable to do otherwise since no creature can thwart God’s plans (Isa 14:27; Job 42:1–2). Speaking of ability in a physical or natural sense, those involved in the crucifixion were not forced or unable to do otherwise. They had no knowledge of the secret decree of God and were acting according to their own desires and not by coercion from God.
Another example that demonstrates the relationship of differing kinds of ability and responsibility is as follows. Suppose Tom wakes up in his home and decides to stay in his bedroom for the entire day. Unbeknownst to Tom, his bedroom door has been barred from the outside so that he is unable to leave his room. In this case, Tom is not able to leave his room, but he had no desire to leave. In this scenario Tom is responsible for staying in his own room even though he was unable to leave. Tom acted according to his free choice, even though it was predetermined that he would not leave his room. Some people may object, saying Tom was not free since he was unable to choose to leave. This provides a segue into the discussion on freedom and the nature of free will.

Free Will

The Bible clearly teaches that man has free will (Josh 24:15), but it does not state the nature of the free will that man possesses. Philosophers continue to argue over the nature of human free will. Free will is typically assumed by indeterminists to be the ability to choose the contrary.²⁸ This freedom to do otherwise is also called contra-causal freedom or libertarian freedom.²⁹ It must be recognized that this type of freedom is logically contradictory with the biblical teaching on divine sovereignty where God has ordained all things with certainty.³⁰ Also in the contra-causal freedom system it must follow that God has a lesser freedom than man since he cannot choose to do evil, yet man can. It also follows that if man has the freedom to do otherwise, then God’s freedom must somehow be subservient. In other words, if God cannot impose himself on man’s contra-causal freedom, but instead must respond to man’s free choices, then God becomes significantly less free than his creation. Such a view must be recognized as unscriptural. Does not the potter have power over the clay (Isa 29:16; Rom 9:21)? In addition, contra-causal freedom must also be rejected in the eternal state. In the eternal state sin will be no more—there will be no possible way to choose evil rather than good.³¹ If humans in the eternal state are free creatures and are unable to sin then either they lack the contra-causal freedom they enjoyed in this world, or are in a sense limited in that they cannot choose contrary when the contrary would involve sin. The true nature of human freedom must be reconciled with determinism, both in this present world and in the eternal state. Contra-causal freedom is incompatible with both, and therefore, is not an option.

Like responsibility and ability, freedom entails a number of senses that must be considered. First, unlike the proponents of contra-causal or libertarian freedom, the biblical witness is clear that mankind is in bondage and is not free. Man is in bondage to sin and does not have the freedom to do what is good (Rom 8:7; 6:15–23; John 8:34; 2 Cor 3:17). Christ is the one who is able to set man free from this bondage (John 8:34–36). This is the most important kind of freedom that is mentioned in Scripture—the freedom from sin given to man by the work of Christ.³² That man is in bondage to sin and not free to do good does not remove the fact that he is a creature subject to moral evaluation from God. Being subject to moral evaluation (i.e., answerable) to God makes humans morally responsible.

Second, if the deterministic viewpoint defended above is correct, how can a human be free if his actions are determined? And if humans are not free, how can they be morally responsible? It is argued here that there is a true sense of human freedom despite their actions being causally determined. Causes can be categorized as constraining and non-constraining causes. A constraining cause would force a person to act against their will, whereas a non-constraining cause would ensure the resulting act but would do so in accordance with the person’s will or desires.

The preeminent example of a non-constraining but causally determined action would be the crucifixion as recounted in Acts 2:23 and Acts 4:27–28. Those who were responsible to crucify Jesus did so in accordance with their desires, yet it was an event predetermined by God to occur. In this case, those who crucified Jesus were not constrained against their will, and so, they acted freely.³³ At the same time God predetermined the events to occur just as they did. But, how could God predetermine that the crucifixion would take place by the willing actions of those involved? The answer is that God not only ordained the ends, but also the means to the ends. God ordained all the necessary influences and circumstances necessary for those involved to act without constraint so that they did exactly what they desired to do and they did exactly what God determined that they should do.³⁴

Therefore, freedom in this sense—man chooses according to his desires—does not logically contradict determinism, but is compatible with it. For this reason it is commonly called “compatibilism.”³⁵ Frame defines compatibilistic freedom as “the freedom to do what you want to do.”³⁶ People behave according to the desires of their heart (Prov 4:23; Luke 6:45; Matt 7:15–20; 12:33–35; Mark 7:21–22). When people do not behave according to their desires, they are either acting irrationally or they are being forced against their will by some external constraint. According to this understanding, even if every act a person ever performs is caused by something or someone else, that person is still free when he chooses to act according to his desires.

To illustrate, suppose Tom must choose between hot chocolate and coffee. Tom is free to choose either. Even though Tom is free, the outcome is determined because Tom dislikes coffee so much that he would never take it. There are sufficient causes in Tom’s past which have shaped his desires or reasons for disliking coffee. There is always a reason or cause that determines what man will choose. However, as has been argued, this does not mean that man is not free to act according to his desires.

The Will, the Heart, and the Determinant of Choice

The human will and the human heart must be distinguished when discussing how free choice is exercised. As noted briefly above, the heart is the source of desires (Prov 4:23) and “the will is the faculty of choice, the immediate cause of all action.”³⁷ Choice is the acceptance of one thing and the refusal of alternatives. The will is not the ultimate cause of choice since there must be something which influences the choice, i.e., which determines the choice. Something causes the will to choose; therefore the will is not the causative agent. If there is indifference between choices, then no choice will be made. As soon as some kind of preference appears, indifference goes away and the choice is made.³⁸

To summarize, what has been argued is that free choice is compatible with the fact that God causes all things. Under God’s sovereignty man still has freedom and acts freely in accordance with his nature and natural desires. Since man is free to act according to his desires, man is responsible for his actions.³⁹

God’s Decree

The nature of God’s decree requires a brief clarification.⁴⁰ God has decreed all that was, is, and is to come (Isa 46:9–10; Eph 1:11). Every human action has been predetermined by God, even the outcome of the roll of the dice (Prov 16:33). God’s decree is his efficacious plan that cannot be thwarted (Job 42:2; Ps 135:6). God’s decree is based on his desires and purposes, so it is only God who is independently free. This, however, does not make man a marionette where God’s decree acts to pull the strings. As a plan, it is not a force or an agent acting in the world to ensure its success. God’s plan does not cause anything to happen. Feinberg states, “While one person’s actions might cause another to act, or a storm might cause a flood, the decree isn’t something that acts or happens in our world, but rather the blueprint for whatever occurs.”⁴¹ There may be a sense in which God’s decree can be thought of as the ultimate or remote cause of all things, but it is God, angels, human beings, and other agents that have actual (immediate) causative power. There is a necessary distinction between the plan and the working out of the plan. This is important when discussing responsibility since, as causative agents, humanity is still responsible for their actions as they carry out the predetermined plan of God.⁴²

A Case for Human Responsibility

As seen in the discussion so far, many factors affect the nature of human responsibility. It is important to remember that as a creature, man is answerable to his creator. In this way, mankind is completely responsible to God, the judge of all intents and actions. This is the primary sense in which man is responsible. The second sense of responsibility, defined in terms of liability, does not have as short an answer. First, humans are liable for actions that are done compatibilistically free. Humans act according to their desires and when they do so, they are culpable for their actions—even though they are sovereignly predetermined. What about actions that people commit because they were forced to do them against their wishes? It may seem natural that man should not at all be held responsible in such cases, but in such cases responsibility may be lessened, but not necessarily removed.⁴³

As an example, consider the scenario where Tom is held at gunpoint and told to hand over his money. Tom chooses to comply and hand over his money. The money that Tom was carrying was not his own, but money raised for charity and he was on his way to deposit it. Is Tom responsible for handing over the charity money? The likely response is “Not at all.” But the fact remains that Tom still willingly handed over the money. He still made the choice to hand over the money, even though his choice was influenced by a threat on his life. Perhaps if Tom refused the assailant would have fled. Perhaps if Tom took precautions in transporting the money this could have been prevented. An endless number of factors are involved, and while Tom’s degree of culpability in the act is low, it cannot be completely removed unless he is physically forced with his will never conceding to the action. While contrived, the point this example intends to illustrate is that man is rarely free of culpability.

As God does not force man in such a way that man cannot act according to his desires, man is culpable (liable) for his actions.⁴⁴ The majority of man’s actions are not coerced as the example above, but are free actions according to his own desires and so he is held fully accountable for those actions. When acting under coercion man is likely still partially accountable for his actions. Therefore, whether responsibility is taken in terms of answering to a higher authority or responsibility is taken in terms of liability, both senses make man responsible. Man is responsible to his creator because he has authority over him and man is liable for his actions since they are compatibilistically free according to his desires.

Divine Responsibility

The discussion to this point has been focused on human responsibility. An arguably more challenging problem involves God and his responsibility for sin. While the focus of this paper is on human responsibility, a brief discussion on the responsibility of God helps to complete the picture of responsibility in a deterministic world.

If God has decreed all that will take place from eternity past—including sin—how is God not responsible for sin? It must first be recognized that from the discussion of responsibility above, God is not responsible in the sense that he is not answerable to a higher authority. God answers to no one and so is not responsible to anyone or anything (except himself). There is no higher authority that is able to judge the actions of God. God is the definition and determiner of what is right.⁴⁵ Concerning responsibility in the second sense (i.e., liability), how is God not liable for sin since he decreed it? It necessarily depends on why God would decree sin, i.e., on the intent of the decree. Also, if God has decreed all that will take place and does no wrong himself, how does he ensure his plan is carried out when it involves so much wickedness? Before looking further at these questions, providence and concurrence must be discussed.

Providence and Concurrence

Providence is the efficacious administration of the things decreed by God.⁴⁶ In order to understand how God administrates his creation, a number of solutions rely on the distinction between primary and secondary causes, but such explanations must avoid two problems. First, if God is directly involved in all secondary causes then the world ends up being pantheistic, where God is in all and is the immediate agent of the causal system.⁴⁷ Second, if God being the primary cause has initiated a series of mechanistic secondary causes then God becomes quasi-deistic.⁴⁸ Both of these pitfalls portray a God foreign to Scripture. Avoiding these errors lead to a vague definition of concurrence: “The cooperation of the divine power with all subordinate powers, according to the pre-established laws of their operation, causing them to act and to act precisely as they do.”⁴⁹ This vagueness is a result of the inability to articulate how God can govern the universe with certainty in terms of causation and not err into pantheism or deism.⁵⁰ What is important to note and what is argued in this paper is that God’s action remains sufficiently indirect to preserve genuine human responsibility.

Mavrodes objects to this notion and sees God’s governing of the universe in this sense to make God responsible for sin. He states, “It implies, so it seems to me, that when a child is raped, then God is the rapist of that child. Of course, His rape of the child is mediate, and there is a human rapist who is the immediate agent of that deed. But the truth, according to this view, is that God (along with the human agent) is also a genuine doer of that deed.”⁵¹ Essentially Mavrodes objection leads to the problem of evil which is beyond the scope of this paper.⁵² However, this paper will briefly respond to the objection.

God’s purpose in creating the present world is wholly righteous and serves his purpose of bringing glory to himself. In this world God desired to create the kind of humans that man is—rational, personal creatures with (compatibilistically) free will. God also created the natural order and natural laws to suit his purposes. God does not alter those natural laws if something bad is going to happen (such as the rape of a child). If God intervened and prevented a person from raping a child (by miraculously stopping them physically or miraculously constraining their will) then his purpose to create creatures like he did is not fulfilled. God has not purposed and is not obligated to stop such evils before they happen. God is not obligated since he answers to no higher authority and God is not liable since he does not constrain the will of the evil doer to do evil (Jas 1:13). In this way, God is not responsible for the sinful acts of men but has included those acts in his plan to serve his good purpose.

Harmonizing Divine Sovereignty, Sin, and Moral Responsibility

How does God receive praise for the good man does, but avoid the responsibility for evil that man commits? Man by nature desires sin and in his natural state cannot please God (Rom 8:8).⁵³ Man in his own power cannot do anything that is good (Rom 3:10–12; Ps 14:1–3; 53:1–4). Therefore, if man is to do something good in God’s eyes, then man must be enabled and empowered by God to do so. In this way, God can be praised for any good that man accomplishes.⁵⁴ It can be said that in Philippians 2:12–13 man is the proximate cause in working out his own salvation, and God is the remote cause doing the enabling and empowering. The same can be said about the inspiration of Scripture, man is the proximate cause and God is the remote cause moving the writers to pen holy writ (1 Pet 1:21). In these cases God is responsible for these good things because his own action is necessary to overcome the inability of man to do these good things.

In a similar way, God cannot be held responsible for the evil that man does. Man’s actions are (compatibilistically) free and, unlike any good deed, God does not need to act so that man does evil. Man’s ability to sin is part of his nature. God does not need to enable man to sin. As for God’s role in sin, Scripture is very clear. God cannot do evil, and cannot be tempted with evil himself (Jas 1:13). According to the Scriptures, man is tempted to do evil because of his own desires (Jas 1:14). Temptations to sin arise during circumstances in daily living (e.g., going to work, to school, shopping).⁵⁵ These usual circumstances are themselves morally neutral, so if God ordains them to be in people’s lives then no culpability for their being tempted in those circumstances can be ascribed to God. The temptation to sin in these circumstances does not come from God, but comes from man’s own desires. As to the proximate cause, people are clearly the actors, not God. Even as a remote cause, God’s involvement is bringing about the circumstances in which man is tempted, not for the pleasure of seeing his creatures sin, but for his good purpose.⁵⁶

As a final question: is God responsible for not enabling and empowering every man to overcome sin? God is not responsible since he is not required to enable and empower every man to overcome sin. The enablement and empowerment that comes from God to man is an act of his grace. Grace by definition is unmerited and ill deserved favor. God is not obligated to give grace, since if he was, grace would be no more grace. Man does not deserve or merit favor from God, therefore, God cannot be held responsible should he choose to withhold it to serve his higher purpose.

Conclusion

The complex relationship between divine sovereignty and human responsibility necessitates a multi-faceted solution. Responsibility, freedom, ability, and the nature and outworking of God’s decree must all be properly understood and grounded in biblical truth in order to understand how mankind is held responsible for sin in a world predetermined by God. While the solution presented above may not explain exactly how God works all things according to the counsel of his will, it does demonstrate why man is responsible for his actions. God decrees all that comes to pass for his own glory. This includes justly punishing the wicked and redeeming unworthy sinners. He is to be praised for both acts. Humanity is responsible to submit to this great God.

Introduction

The extent, or better, the intent of the atonement is “one of the most controversial teachings in Reformed soteriology.”¹ There are numerous textual and logical arguments used and abused by proponents who enter the debate. Heated discussions go back and forth due to a passion for the beauty and efficacy of the atonement, the grace and love of God, and the dignity and supreme worth of Jesus Christ, the suffering servant. The purpose of this paper is to present positive arguments for a definite atonement and to offer a critique of the universal atonement position. To that end, four main arguments will be presented for a definite atonement followed by an evaluation and critique of four main arguments for a universal atonement.

Limiting the Scope

The length of this paper limits the number of texts and arguments that can be discussed in detail. In that regard, texts mentioned in the discussion are those seen as most convincing in the minds of their supporters. Moreover, only views of the atonement under a Calvinistic theological system will be considered and discussed. The Scriptures are clear that salvation is a monergistic work and the atonement is part of that work, as such, other views (e.g., Arminian view of a general atonement) are not discussed. Therefore, when speaking of an unlimited atonement or universal atonement, it is meant to be taken in a Calvinistic sense, i.e., the application of this universal atonement remains the prerogative and effectual working of the triune God and not man.

Statement of Positions

Definite atonement (also referred to as limited atonement, particular atonement, or particular redemption) argues that Christ died intending to effectively die for the elect only, thereby securing their salvation. The limitation on the atonement is not because of any external condition, but God’s decree. Universal atonement (also referred to as multiple intentions view, unlimited atonement, un/limited atonement, four-point Calvinism, or universal provision–limited application) argues that (1) Christ’s death was a provisional (yet actual, and not hypothetical) payment for the sins of every single person; and it (2) secured the saving benefits of the cross for the elect.²

Arguing for Definite Atonement

Admittedly, there are not a large number of texts that explicitly teach definite atonement. Such is to be expected for a doctrine that is heavily debated. There are, however, a number of texts in both Old and New Testaments related to the nature of penal substitution and atonement which are helpful in understanding the intent of the atonement. A number of textual and theological arguments can be offered for the doctrine. Four will be discussed in this section in support of definite atonement. They are: (1) Trinitarian harmony; (2) the nature of substitution; (3) exclusion passages; and (4) the efficacy of the cross.

1. Trinitarian Harmony

In Ephesians 1:3–14, Paul offers a thanksgiving and praise of what God has done in Christ. The passage can be divided in such a way that highlights how each member of the Triunity is involved in redemption. Verses 3–6 speak about the Father’s choice in election: “He chose us in [Christ] before the foundation of the world,” and “he predestined us for adoption as sons” (Eph 1:4–5).³ Verses 7–12 speak of the redemption purchased with the Son’s blood: “In him we have redemption through his blood” (Eph 1:7). And, verses 13–14 speak of the Spirit’s sealing: “You also, when you heard the word of truth, the gospel of your salvation, and believed in him, were sealed with the promised Holy Spirit” (Eph 1:13). The objects of the Father’s election, the Son’s redemption and the Spirit’s sealing are the same throughout the passage, viz., the elect. This continuity suggests that those whom the Father elects are the same as those for whom the Son sheds his blood and are the same as those whom the Spirit seals.⁴

The work of the Father and Spirit exclusively for the elect is agreed by all parties—even if their view of the extent of the atonement differs. However, the unlimited atonement position makes the work of the Son extend to every single person and suggests disunity between Father, Son, and Spirit.⁵ The entire passage from verse 3 to 14 “presents Father, Son, and Spirit working in unison to save their people, and this implies a definite or limited atonement.”⁶ In other words, the Father’s sovereign choice to save a people for his name is accomplished by the Son in his substitutionary death and the saving benefits are applied by the Spirit. Therefore, what is argued is that the intent of the Son’s death is the same as the Father’s sovereign choice and the Spirits work of application.

Other passages also speak on the unity between Father and Son in redeeming a particular people. In John 4:34 Jesus says, “My food is to do the will of him who sent me and to accomplish his work;” and as stated in John 5:19, Jesus does “nothing of his own accord.”⁷ Jesus lived to do the Father’s will, and this includes giving eternal life to all those whom the Father has chosen (John 17:2). He manifested the Father to those whom the Father elected (John 17:6). He prayed for those whom the Father had given to him, not for those of the world (John 17:9). This unity of purpose must also apply to the cross-work of Christ. Why would Christ, coming to do the very will of the Father in all respects, provide atonement for those whom the Father never chose to redeem? The Fathers intent is to redeem a particular people, and therefore, some are excluded. The Son, sent to do the Father’s will in saving a particular people again implies a definite atonement.

2. Exclusion Passages

The previous section argued for a definite atonement by noting the unity between Father, Son, and Spirit in the work of redemption. The work of the Father and Spirit are clearly exclusive to the elect and therefore, the Son, acting in harmony with the will of God, would also atone exclusively for the elect. Countering this argument, those who support a universal provision would argue that the intent of the triune God is to provide atonement for all, but limit its application to the elect. Therefore, the intention of Father, Son, and Spirit are united in providing atonement for all, and in applying the saving benefits of it to the elect. The burden of proof then shifts back to those who hold to particular atonement to provide passages that speak of the exclusive work of Son on behalf of the elect. This section, therefore, presents exclusion passages (i.e., passages that say the Son did not die for the non-elect) and argues that they support a particular atonement.

Of course passages that say that Christ gave himself for his friends (John 15:13), or his people (Matt 1:21), do not of necessity mean that he did not die for those who are not his friends or those who are not his people.⁸ Galatians 2:20, where Paul states that Jesus “loved me and gave himself for me,” does not intend to teach that Jesus died only for Paul and for no one else. The same reasoning is said to apply to passages where Jesus gave himself for the church (Acts 20:28; Eph 5:23–27; 1 Cor 8:11; Rom 14:15), the many (Matt 20:28; 26:28), the elect (Rom 8:32–34), and for us (Titus 2:14). While these texts are not conclusive in proving a limited atonement they are consistent with it. In fact, it can be argued that these texts make much better sense of a particular atonement than a universal one.⁹ In addition, these texts are not the only verses in support of particular atonement, but they must be interpreted in light of passages which implicitly and explicitly include the elect and exclude the non-elect. These explicit exclusion texts will be discussed now.

In John 10:11 and 15 Jesus states that he is the good shepherd who lays down his life for his sheep. While not immediately stating that he did not lay down his life for those who are not his sheep, the context and figure of speech he used implies that he gave himself for his sheep to the exclusion of others. More direct, in verse 26, he talks to the Jews and says, “you do not believe because you are not among my sheep.” The passage seems clear in teaching that Jesus gave himself for his sheep and gave them belief leading to eternal life, and those in verse 26 who do not believe, he did not give his life.¹⁰ The context is clear that he did not lay down his life for the strangers, wolves, thieves, robbers, and those outside his flock. Those who do not believe are not his sheep and do not enjoy eternal life purchased by the laying down of his life.

Another passage that explicitly excludes the non-elect from the benefits of the cross-work of Christ is found in John 17. Christ’s high priestly prayer opens with: “Father, the hour has come; glorify your Son that the Son may glorify you, since you have given him authority over all flesh, to give eternal life to all whom you have given him” (John 17:1b–2). He opens by noting that even though he has “authority over all flesh,” he gives eternal life to all whom the Father has given. John 3:16 states that God loves the world, but in John 17:9 Jesus prays not for the world, but those whom the Father has given him out of the world. In other words, while praying as high priest specifically about the salvation of the elect, he excludes those who are not his.¹¹ The same exclusive group of people for which Christ is interceding is in view in John 17:19 where Jesus says, “For their sake I consecrate myself, that they also may be sanctified in truth.” That is, when Jesus consecrates himself as high priest, he does so for the sake of those whom the Father has given him (the elect) and to the explicit exclusion of the non-elect.

3. The Nature of Substitution

Penal substitution is an important doctrine and one that implies a particular atonement. The nature of substitution is a personal one, i.e., one person takes the place of another person and vice versa. It must be differentiated from penal satisfaction—where there is a potential satisfaction for all with an actual satisfaction for some. This is not penal substitution. Sinners have amassed great personal guilt before God and are individually culpable—this demands a personal substitute. This personal substitution is exactly what is meant by a particular atonement.

By including all sin (rather than particular people) in the substitutionary work of Christ suggests a diminishing of the personal aspect of the death of Christ. Granted, to say that Christ made a provisional substitution for everyone which is only made effective when God regenerates them does have some merit. It is granted that Christ’s substitutionary atonement on behalf of the elect was made as a provision (argued here to be a guaranteed provision) until the time of regeneration when the benefits of Christ’s death are applied. However, there is an important distinction between a universal provision and a particular provision which guarantees the application of the benefits of Christ’s work. This certainty of application is due to the personal nature of substitution where the elect are known personally to God because of his decree (Rev 13:8; Eph 1:4). Christ’s cross-work was a proleptic accomplishment, not a mere provision possibly applied, but it was actually finished and guaranteed. His person for person work necessitates it.

The personal nature of substitution has implications not only for the death of Christ, but also for his resurrection. Scripture says that Christ died a substitutionary death, therefore, everyone for whom Christ has died, has died with him (2 Cor 5:14). And, everyone who has died with Christ, will live (Rom 6:8; Gal 2:20). If all those who have been crucified with Christ will be raised to new life, then a definite atonement is necessary or else universalism results. If, however, Christ’s substitutionary work was done for everyone, is there not a sense which one who has rejected the grace of God say “I have been crucified with Christ” (Gal 2:20) like Paul and every one of the redeemed?

To suggest the idea of a provisional or potential union in the death and resurrection of Christ is difficult in this case. There is no textual basis found to assume that all have died in Christ provisionally or potentially.

4. Efficacy of the Cross

Does Scripture present the atonement as making provision for all or as effective for some?¹² Berkof states that “there is an inseparable connection between the purchase and the actual bestowal of salvation.”¹³ He makes this statement when considering texts such as “we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son” (Rom 5:10); “[Christ] gave himself for our sins to deliver us” (Gal 1:4); “Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law by becoming a curse for us” (Gal 3:13); “you were ransomed…with the precious blood of Christ” (1 Pet 1:18–19); “He himself bore our sins in his body on the tree” (1 Pet 2:24); “we have redemption through his blood” (Eph 1:7); “the Son of Man came to seek and to save the lost” (Luke 19:10). These passages do seem to inseparably link the accomplishment/provision of the cross and the actual application of the benefits. If Christ became an actual curse for every single person, how are not all redeemed (Gal 3:13)? To divorce the provision and application in such a way that there can be provision but never an application seems to run counter to these texts. To see why this is the case, the goal of this section is to examine passages on the efficacy of the cross and see why they are best explained by a particular atonement.¹⁴

One such passage is Revelation 5:9, “Worthy are you to take the scroll and to open its seals, for you were slain, and by your blood you ransomed people for God from every tribe and language and people and nation.” The significance of this passage is that Jesus purchased a part of the human race from a larger whole. From every tribe and language and people and nation (i.e., from humankind), Jesus has purchased some by his blood. This means that Christ’s death via his substitutionary atonement actually purchased a group of people from the world.¹⁵ It does not say that Christ died for every single person but that he died for people from every nation, and that his death actually purchased them (thus guaranteeing their salvation).

The efficacy of a particular atonement can also be demonstrated from Romans 8:31–39. Romans 8:32 says, “He who did not spare his own Son but gave him up for us all, how will he not also with him graciously give us all things?” The “us” in this text is the elect (Rom 8:33) and the underlying assumption is arguably a particular atonement. If a universal provision for everyone without exception has been made then the non-elect seemingly qualify for the reception of “all things.” Paul’s argument loses its meaning if Christ has died for every single person. Instead, the link between the atonement and the guarantee or efficacy of the application is what is in view. The elect can find solace and assurance in this passage since Christ has died for them, and if he has done that, will he withhold anything from them?

The union with Christ in his death, and the guaranteed benefits of his life have been argued previously. The efficacy of this relationship is highlighted here. As argued, everyone for whom Christ has died, has died with him (2 Cor 5:14). And, “if we have died with Christ, we believe that we will also live with him” (Rom 6:8). In other words, everyone that has died with Christ will also live with him. Christ died on behalf of the elect which effectively secures their salvation. That is, there is an efficacy, an unbroken chain between those for whom Christ died and those who will be raised in newness of life (Rom 6:4).

Critics of particular atonement argue that substitution is not necessarily efficacious or automatic, i.e., a penalty can be paid without it automatically taking effect.¹⁶ This is a necessary presupposition for the universalist, since, if substitution were automatic or effectual, then everyone for whom Christ substituted would be saved (i.e., it would necessitate a particular atonement).¹⁷ However, nowhere does Scripture say that Christ died to make provision for redemption, expiation, propitiation, or reconciliation. All of these things are spoken in terms that suggest efficacy.¹⁸ That is, Christ did not merely make a payment, but he made a payment that was accepted by the Father, thereby propitiating his wrath and working reconciliation (Heb 10:12–14). In other words, Christ made a purchase, not strictly a payment. All for whom this payment was made and accepted will be effectively saved—purchased for God.

5. Other Supporting Arguments

Besides the textual arguments mentioned above, there have historically been a number of logical arguments offered for particular atonement. Logical arguments have a place but these arguments should be seen as secondary to the exegetical arguments since the text of Scripture must always be the norma normans non normata (“norming norm that cannot be normed”). For example, a common logical argument for particular atonement is the argument of double jeopardy or double payment.¹⁹ The argument asserts that if Christ has died to take away the sins of unbelievers, then God is unjust to punish unbelievers in hell. If God’s wrath has been propitiated for every single person (1 John 2:2) then how can he punish anyone in hell? In response, those holding to a universal provision will say that there is no double payment involved since Christ’s provision made on the cross was not applied to unbelievers. Arguments such as this can go back and forth and in the end, must be settled by the text of Scripture. In light of the problems of logical argumentation, two further textual arguments supporting a particular atonement will be examined now.

i. Universal Atonement Proof-Texts

While seemingly counterintuitive, texts traditionally used to argue for a universal atonement can also be used to argue for a particular atonement. Two of these passages (John 1:29 and 1 John 2:2) will be examined here.

John 1:29 says, “The next day [John the Baptist] saw Jesus coming toward him, and said, ‘Behold, the Lamb of God, who takes away the sin of the world!’” and 1 John 2:2 says, “He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only but also for the sins of the whole world.” In each of these texts the discussion often centers on the interpretation of “world.” Is “world” to be seen as (1) everyone without exception (every single individual) or (2) everyone without distinction (Jew, Gentile, slave, free, male, female, etc.)? Critics of particular atonement argue that a straight forward reading of the text must understand “world” in the first sense and that qualifying “world” to mean everyone without distinction “always has the feel of special pleading.”²⁰ The criticism suggests that a theological presupposition is being forced upon the text. Is this criticism valid? Is the doctrine of particular atonement unable to handle these texts and must it qualify the normal understanding of the term “world” to make these texts fit?

It is typically argued by particularists that “world” can mean many different things.²¹ And, it is generally agreed by all that not every instance of the word “world” carries the same meaning.²² As mentioned earlier, Revelation 5:9 can be used as warrant for seeing “world” as the world without distinction.²³ However, the most convincing argument does not come from other passages, but from John 1:29 and 1 John 2:2 themselves. Discussions on the meaning of the word “world” overlook the other important key term in each passage. In one case Jesus takes away the sin of the whole world, and in the second case, Jesus is the propitiation for the whole world. In both cases qualifications must be made or else these texts teach universalism and contradict the rest of Scripture. In the case of John 1:29, either “he takes away sin” or “whole world” must be qualified. And, in the case of 1 John 2:2, either “he is the propitiation” or “for the whole world” must be qualified. Those not holding to a particular atonement and see the qualification of “whole world” as special pleading must instead qualify “take way sin” and “propitiation” to be a provisional taking away and a provisional propitiation.²⁴

Propitiation is the “placating, pacifying, or appeasing of one’s anger or wrath.”²⁵ In this case, Christ’s death is the sacrifice that removes God’s wrath. The other three times propitiation is used in Scripture (Rom 3:25; Heb 2:17; 1 John 4:10) propitiation only refers to the elect. Therefore, from the word itself, its context, and how it’s used in Scripture, adding qualifications to propitiation to make it provisional lacks warrant. Whereas, the efficacy of the atonement, the infinite value of Christ, and other passages such as Revelation 5:9 imply that qualification of the “whole world” to mean “world without distinction” is warranted in both passages and is better suited than qualifying the act of propitiation or what it means to “take away sin.”

Therefore, “takes away sin” and “propitiation” in these passages speak to the accomplishment, efficacy, and particularity of the atonement. Out of the world, from every tongue, tribe, and nation, God’s people were redeemed. Christ efficaciously took away sin, and propitiated the wrath of God for his people.

ii. Old Testament Typology

The Old Testament sacrifices were modeled after the sacrifice of Christ, and therefore, are relevant to this discussion.²⁶ Jesus’ death is associated with the Passover lamb (Matt 26:17–19; 26–28) and the historic Passover lamb (Exod 12) was strictly for God’s chosen people and not for the unbelieving Egyptians. Similarly, Christ is commonly referred to as high priest and the high priest interceded for God’s people (Lev 16), not for everyone in the world. The sacrifices were not for the Assyrians, Amalekites, or Canaanites. Likewise, Christ, acting as high priest, made atonement for the sins of God’s people.²⁷

Evaluation and Critique of Universal Provision

Positive arguments for the doctrine of particular redemption have been presented without much interaction with the universal provision and limited application view. It is to this task to which this paper will now turn. What follows is an attempt to clearly and succinctly state the position of universal atonement. After which, arguments in support of the doctrine are outlined then critiqued. The goal is to follow the advice of Mortimer Adler, who rightly surmises that one must be able to say “I understand,” before one can say “I disagree.”²⁸

Statement of Position

Universal atonement can be described as a universal provision and a particular application. Universal provision is the idea that Christ made an actual payment for the sins of every single individual.²⁹ Particular application is the idea that the saving benefits of the atonement are applied solely to the elect. In this way, the doctrine accounts for both the texts which speak of Christ’s atonement in universal terms (speaking of the provision), and Christ’s atonement in particular terms (speaking of the application). The view is not to be confused with the Arminian view of universal atonement in that this view correctly recognizes that the saving benefits are applied solely on the free, sovereign choice of God himself.³⁰

The position is also championed as the multiple intentions view of the atonement. Bruce Ware lists the following five intentions:

1) Christ died for the purpose of securing the sure and certain salvation of his own, his elect. 2) Christ died for the purpose of paying the penalty for the sin of all people making it possible for all who believe to be saved. 3) Christ died for the purpose of securing the bone fide offer of salvation to all people everywhere. 4) Christ died for the purpose of providing an additional basis for condemnation for those who hear and reject the gospel that has been genuinely offered to them. 5) Christ died for the purpose of reconciling all things to the Father.³¹

The number of intentions and the precise nature of intentions are a matter of discussion among supporters of the view, but the first two in Ware’s list are common to all. While multiple intentions can be seen by both particularists and non, nevertheless, the idea is significant. If Christ died for the intent of paying the penalty for the sin of all people and for the intent of securing the salvation of the elect, then atonement texts do not need to be forced to agree. It does not need to be either/or, but rather, both/and. Atonement texts that speak in universal terms can be taken at face value; and atonement texts that speak of particularity can likewise be taken at face value. These seemingly contradictory texts are that way because there are multiple intentions in the atonement—with universal and particular elements.

A complete discussion on the different intentions of the atonement is beyond the scope of this paper, but the one intent that will be discussed is that “Christ died for the purpose of paying the penalty for the sin of all people.” This will be the main point of emphasis in the critique. It will be argued that Christ did not die for the purpose of paying the penalty for the sin of all people; rather he died to pay the penalty for the sin of his elect only.

Critique

In this section, three main textual arguments used to support a universal atonement are examined. The arguments are based on passages that speak of: (1) a universal atonement or provision; (2) Christ dying for the lost; and (3) God’s love for the world. What is important to note is that texts portraying the atonement in universal terms are treated “as normative or determinative.”³² These texts will be examined to see if taking them as determinative is warranted. Due to limitations in space, all texts used to support a universal atonement cannot be dealt with. The texts that are discussed were chosen because they are the most common or deemed most convincing by advocates of a universal atonement.

After the discussion of these three textual arguments, one logical argument will be considered, viz., the infinite value of Christ demands an infinite/unlimited atonement. Other logical arguments such as: a universal atonement must provide the basis for common grace, and a universal atonement provides a genuine offer of the gospel³³ will not be discussed as textual arguments receive priority.

1. Universal Atonement Passages

Two common passages that put the atonement in seemingly universal terms (John 1:29; 1 John 2:2) have already been discussed above and were used to argue for a particular atonement.³⁴ What is considered by some proponents of a universal provision to be an indisputable text is 1 Timothy 4:10, “…we have our hope set on the living God, who is the Savior of all people, especially of those who believe.”³⁵ But how exactly does this verse teach a universal atonement? Erickson says, “Apparently the Savior has done something for all persons, though it is less in degree than what he has done for those who believe.”³⁶ If the context is soteriological, how does God save all people (i.e., both unbelievers who are eternally damned, and believers who are eternally saved) and especially save those who believe (i.e., believers who are eternally saved)? How can God be seen as the Savior of those who are perishing eternally? Seeing this passage as a proof text for a universal provision with a particular application seems to be imposing the doctrine onto the text.³⁷

What is the proper understanding of 1 Timothy 4:10? The option of seeing “all people” here as every kind of people is not a workable one. To demonstrate, the statement “God is the Savior of Jews, Greeks, Scythians, Barbarians, and especially those who believe” is a nonsensical statement because of the categorical mismatch. Along a different line of argumentation, some argue that “especially” would be better translated “namely” or “that is.” This would render the text to be “God is the Savior of all men, that is, those who believe.” While potentially helpful, one would have to wonder why Paul did not use the normal words for “that is” (cf. Rom 7:18).

A better and more plausible understanding, both linguistically and contextually, is summarized by Steven Baugh.³⁸ Baugh argues that this passage is speaking of common grace, i.e., God “makes his sun rise on the evil and on the good, and sends rain on the just and on the unjust” (Matt 5:45). In this understanding, the passage is not soteriological and sheds no light on the extent of the atonement.³⁹ Some object to this understanding on the basis that Pauline usage of “Savior” is consistently soteriological.⁴⁰ What Baugh demonstrates in his article is that the historical context of “Savior” must be considered, i.e., the time and place (Ephesus) to which the letter was written sheds important insight. During that time and in Ephesus the term “Savior” was a common term meaning “protector,” “benefactor,” or “patron.”⁴¹ However, this is not only a meaning made possible by the historical context; it is made probable by the immediate context of 1 Timothy 4:7–10.⁴² Paul is referring to the historical circumstances at Ephesus when he mentions bodily training, an activity that Greeks held in high regard. Paul points out that while bodily training is of some value, godliness is of value in this life and the life to come. In verse 10, he comments on this saying as trustworthy because God provides good things to all, but especially to those who believe. That is, verse 10 is the basis for verse 8. God provides benefits to those who devote themselves to bodily training, but God especially provides benefits to those who devote themselves to godliness “for the present life and also for the life to come” (1 Tim 4:8).

Therefore, 1 Timothy 4:10 is not speaking of the atonement but is speaking of God being the benefactor for all people, giving common grace to all and especially to those who believe. This interpretation agrees with the historical context of the letter and more importantly the literary context of 1 Timothy 4:7–10.

2. Christ Died for the Lost

If it could be demonstrated from Scripture that Christ died for the lost, then particular atonement must be false. The whole idea of particular atonement is that Christ did not die for the lost, but he died only for the elect. A verse which is said to teach that Christ in fact did die for some of the lost, and thus support an unlimited atonement is 2 Peter 2:1: “But false prophets also arose among the people, just as there will be false teachers among you, who will secretly bring in destructive heresies, even denying the Master who bought them, bringing upon themselves swift destruction.”⁴³ Does this verse teach that Christ died for these false teachers who eternally perish? What does “Master who bought them” mean? Can it be assumed that what is being spoken of here is a universal, provisional atonement that was not savingly applied?

First, it must be noted that “bought” is a difficult term for the those who argue that this passage is talking of a provisional atonement. Shedd, who defends a universal provision, says: “Atonement must be distinguished from redemption. The latter term includes the application of the atonement. It is the term redemption, not atonement, that is found in those statements that speak of the world of Christ as limited by the decree of election.”⁴⁴ That is, Shedd argues that the atonement is universal and speaks of the provision of the cross, but redemption is limited to the elect and speaks of the application of the saving benefits of the cross. This is significant because the term “bought” in 2 Peter 2:1 is best understood to be synonymous with redemption and not atonement.⁴⁵ Therefore, the text would mean that Christ redeemed some who were lost, which is not what is argued by proponents of a universal provision.⁴⁶ It also questions the sufficiency of Christ’s atonement. If these false teachers were bought, is Christ’s purchase in vain? Can Christ pay the purchase price for their salvation and have it rejected by men? This cannot be the proper understanding of the text.

Other problems also appear if “bought” is understood to be a provisional payment rather than an actual purchase. The meaning of the word is: to buy, purchase, or acquire.⁴⁷ It speaks of a complete transaction, not just a payment or provision made. This leads to wondering as to why Peter would use “bought” here to communicate the idea of a provisional payment that still required their acceptance to make it an actual purchase.

In addition to the word “bought”, it is unclear who “Master” is referring to. The term is not the usual title for Christ, but it is used of him in Jude 4. Since the term is also used of God the Father (Luke 2:29; Acts 4:24; Rev 6:10), it is unclear whether the text is referring to Christ or to the Father. What is argued in using this text as support for a universal atonement is that “Master” refers to Christ, and “bought” refers to a provisional atonement on the cross. However, both of these are not explicit in the text and, as shown above, it is very improbable that “bought” is referring to a provisional atonement.⁴⁸

What is the proper understanding of this text? Gary Long documents four differing views on this text, two of them view the passage as soteriological and two do not.⁴⁹ He argues for a commonly held understanding which sees the text being an Old Testament allusion to Deuteronomy 32:6.⁵⁰ In that passage, Moses says to the rebellious people who have turned away from God: “Do you thus repay the LORD, O foolish and unwise people? Is not He your Father who has bought you?” (NASB). Like the rebellious false prophets who denied the God who bought them out of the land of Egypt, these false teachers are now denying their sovereign master who has worked mightily in their day.⁵¹ Understanding the Old Testament allusion, these teachers would realize that Peter is grouping them with the false prophets of the past. Therefore, 2 Peter 2:1 is not a text which demonstrates that Christ died for the lost.

3. God’s Universal Love

Does God only love some sinners? That is the question that starts off one book that argues for a universal atonement.⁵² What is made explicit by supporters of a universal atonement is that “there seems to be a contradiction between the scriptural indications of God’s love for the world, for all persons, and the belief that Christ did not die for all of them.”⁵³ The text that is used more than any other is John 3:16: “For God so loved the world, that he gave his only Son, that whoever believes in him should not perish but have eternal life.” Erickson argues that if God commands us to love our enemies (Matt 5:44), then certainly God loves his enemies (Rom 5:8), presumably those who do not even become believers.⁵⁴

It must be recognized that because God would love his elect in a special way does not mean that he does not love the reprobate in any sense. Scripture portrays God’s love in many different senses or ways.⁵⁵ God does love the world, but he does not love everyone with the effective love with which he loves the elect. Supporters of both a limited atonement and a universal atonement would agree that God loves the elect in a special way—Scripture and a monergistic salvation demands such.

So how is John 3:16 to be understood? The purpose clause gives the reason why God sent his Son: to save those who believe. This purpose comports with both a universal and a particular view of the atonement. The point of focus, however, is placed on the phrase “For God so loved the world.” However, this phrase does not mean that God loved the world so much, defining his love in terms of a measurable quantity. Rather, the word translated “so” has the sense “in such a manner.”⁵⁶ In other words, God loved the world in such a manner that he gave his only Son for the purpose that the one believing in him will have eternal life. Moreover, the “world” that John is talking about is not every single person (and is not the world of elect as some wrongly surmise), but it is a normal Johannine usage which means the “moral order in willful and culpable rebellion against God.”⁵⁷ Therefore, the idea being conveyed is not that God’s love is extended to such a big thing as the world, but to such a bad thing, i.e., not to so many people, but to so bad a people. With this understanding, John 3:16 offers no insight into the extent of the atonement as commonly thought by those who advocate an unlimited atonement.

4. Infinite Work of Christ Must Cover All Sin

A logical argument that deserves a response is that the infinite nature of Christ demands, as a logical corollary, an infinite atonement. Since the value of the atonement is based on the dignity and worth of Christ, his death is sufficient to save all sinners in the world. This is a true statement and advocates of particular redemption affirm this truth.⁵⁸ Christ’s atoning work on the cross cannot be qualified as in the number of sins or amount of sin that it covers; his death is of supreme value and has no limit. But does such an understanding imply or demand an unlimited atonement? While Christ’s death is of infinite value, his death was a substitutionary one, one where his sheep are proleptically united with him in his death and are raised to life in his resurrection. While unlimited as to the worth of the atonement, the substitutionary aspect makes it personal and limited to the elect chosen before the foundation of the world. This “limitation” on the infinite accomplishment of Christ should not be a logical problem for advocates of an unlimited atonement. The application of Christ’s atonement is said to be personal and specific even though the atonement was of infinite value. In the same manner, the provision can be personal and specific while remaining meritoriously infinite.⁵⁹

Conclusion

There are many passages of Scripture upon first reading seem to put the atonement in universal terms, i.e., an actual provision was made for everyone. However, upon closer examination, the payment (purchase) for sin is a special and efficacious act of God for his elect only. The exclusion passage in John 10, the nature of substitution, and the efficacy of the cross are strong arguments in favor of a definite atonement. Moreover, as was demonstrated, careful exegesis of the universal texts are problematic for the unlimited atonement position. That is, these texts do not teach a universal atonement when they are examined closer. Therefore, the definite atonement position best accounts for the evidence from Scripture and is in keeping with God’s gracious act to redeem a people for his name.